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1 Introduction 
Integrated Systems Inc. (lSI) is pleased to submit the Phase I Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) Final Report to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). This project has involved the feasibility study of using 
expert system technology for real-time fault detection, isolation and self-correcting 
control for applications of high performance aircraft flight environments. The goals 
of the Phase I study have been to analyze several different expert system structures 
and determine important fundamental aspects required in a real-time environment. 
The main sections of this report give a research summary of the investigation of 
each specific area. 
1.1 Project Summary 
The results of the Phase I effort were as follows: 
(i) Determination of key features required to address the issues of real-time on-
line monitoring and self-repairing expert systems. 
(ii) Design of architecture of embedded expert system required to incorporate and 
utilize features for real-time use. 
(iii) Integration technique required to interface the embedded expert system with 
an aircraft flight control system. 
(iv) Creation of a simple expert system to demonstrate the techniques and the 
feasibility of the proposed structure to accomplish real-time on-line fault de-
tection, isolation and self-repairing control. 
The remainder of this report represents the work supporting the above summary 
and the feasibility of the design of the proposed expert system. 
1.2 Phase I Research Effort 
NASA is strongly committed to the strategic goal to develop and apply artificial 
intelligence technology for aircraft automation including: 1) goal directed guidance, 
2) intelligent advisors, and 3) improvements to human error tolerance. Secondly, 
NASA is committed to provide a national capability for simulation and flight val-
idation of this technology. Three specific areas for which NASA Ames/Dryden is 
responsible include: 
1 
1. Automatic fault tolerance and system reconfiguration, 
2. Real-time expert systems to monitor flight test, and 
3. The use of expert systems in the air combat context. 
These three areas all involve advanced guidance and control technology. Although 
research in guidance algorithms have advanced technology, it is the incorporation 
of expert systems, particularly real-time expert systems, which give a much more 
sophisticated automated system. The effort of the research conducted under this 
SBIR by Integrated Systems Inc. (lSI) is directed toward the fault tolerant and 
system reconfiguraiion area, together with the development of simulation and rapid 
prototyping tools. It is lSI's feeling that a combination of research of the problem 
area together with tool development will most quickly advance the state-of-the-art 
in this area. 
The innovation in automation will come from considering both a near term more 
manageable demonstration problem in the context of flight testing, together with 
. the long term complex and involved problem; namely, automatic fault tolerance and 
system reconfiguration for high performance aircraft in normal operating conditions. 
1.3 Summary 
The work performed under Phase I of the SBIR has concentrated on the technology 
required for the development of an embedded real-time on-line expert system inter-
faced to an aircraft flight control system. The work has based the foundation and 
feasibility of the proposed effort to continue and eventually lead into a prototype 
development of a real-time system by the completion of Phase II. 
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2 Phase I Research Objectives 
Based on the need for goal directed guidance and artificial intelligence-aided fault 
detection and diagnosis for aircraft automation demonstrations discussed in the 
previous section, the program here has concentrated on the following research ob-
jectives: 
(i) Research an expert system architecture for fault detection, isolation, and re-
configuration for aircraft flight control for normal aircraft operation applica-
tion and demonstration on flight test environment. 
(ii) A technology to interface the embedded expert system with data acquisition, 
computational algorithms, operator displays, and other real-time computation 
functions. 
(iii) Specify key intrinsic features of the expert system necessary for real-time on-
line functioning. 
(iv) Develop rules and a knowledge base for a simple aircraft model for the expert 
system and interface the model algorithms. 
(v) Develop scenarios of simulated flight test and faults for demonstration of ex-
pert system logic and operation. 
The final goal and structure for the expert system and the reconfigurable control 
system is shown in figure 1. The dividing line between the expert system the 
conventional numerical algorithms, is to be stressed. This division bypasses the 
expert system is an easy task and can be done with minimal software effort. The 
expert system in this structure is meant to enhance the conventional controller 
rather than replace it. Using this structure will minimize the effort required for 
implementation, yet offer a convenient package for interfacing peripheral software 
routines in the future. 
2.1 Final SBIR Objectives and Potential Applications 
2.1.1 Commercial Applications 
Long term commercial applications would be the major aerospace and avionics 
systems integrators with CAE tools based on this technology to dramatically reduce 
the development time for advanced fault tolerant and self-repairing flight control 
systems. 
3 
""'if----
., 
Other Estimators I 
Reconfigurable : 
Monitoring 
& I> Library 
of 
Algorithm Rcconfiguration Expert System 
L NU~ri~ Controller • : 
4 -:.---~ Verification of 
New Scheme 
Conventional 
L---------l>1 Code Generation 
of New 
Numerical 
Scheme 
Dynamic Monitoring 
Controller <: ___ ....., ...-___ :> Expert System 
._. __ .............. _ .. > Decision Commnnd 
~ Data Flow 
Figure 1: Expert System for Self-Correcting Flight Control 
4 
~ 
'If 
d 
I: 
,. 
l' 
_to 
2. 
2.1.2 Federal Systems 
Advanced aircraft automation is needed by NASA, the Department of Defense, 
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for a variety of complex tasks. 
The technology could lead to significantly improved near term automation demon-
strations such as a flight test monitoring, and a rapid introduction of combined 
guidance/control and-expert systems. Autonomous Land Vechicle and Pilot's As-
sociate, DARPA Strategic Computing Programs would benefit directly from this 
effort also. 
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3 Technical Background 
Fault detection, isolation, and accommodation (FDIA) has been of considerable 
interest for the last ten years (although suitable algorithms for detection are still a 
research topic). Whereas the concept of "diagnosis" and "self-repairing" are more 
recent attempts to structure "intelligent" control systems which include real-time 
expert systems as well as some standard types of guidance and control logic. There 
are three ways that real-time expert systems will contribute to this much larger 
concept for fault tolerant and self-repairing control; 
(i) in the diagnosis of flight control systems on-line, 
(ii) in the integration of logic based diagnosis and detailed model based analytic 
redundancy, and 
(iii) in mechanizing alternate reconfiguration strategies once the fault is isolated/diagnosed. 
We will first summarize an understanding of the most promising diagnostic tech-
niques, then the current state-of-the-art in analytically redundant fault detection, 
discussing how the expert systems portion will aid in integrating the two types of 
models, as well as mechanizing a reconfiguration strategy. 
3.1 Fault Diagnosis in Aircraft Flight Control 
Recent research, both in the area of on-line fault diagnosis [1] and in off-line advisors 
for numerical algorithms [2], the recognition has been made that underlying models 
of the situation are in fact the appropriate inference guide, particularily if combined 
with some general "common sense", or rule-based shallow reasoning. In [1] the 
deeper inference model came from the mechanical and electrical interconnections. In 
[2] the model came from a qualitative model of the underlying optimization goal and 
the monotonic relation between frequency domain an~ysis criteria and the design 
goal. For aircraft flight control fault diagnosis we need to consider a spectrum of 
increasingly detailed models for a sufficiently deep inference foundation. 
(i) rule based logic for overall system and some subsystem performance, 
(ii) qualitative models on performance changes of flight control subsystems, 
(iii) transition models, or a discrete event simulation of the state of the different 
subsystems in relation to each other, and 
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(iv) detailed qualitative models for the interconnected dynamics of the aircraft. 
In combining recent FDIA analytic redundancy approaches, with real-time ex-
pert systems, we may well discover in the research that qualitative or transition 
models are required to bridge the gap between the technologies. The qualitative 
model descriptions and evaluations would most appropriately fit into the real-time 
expert system module, while the run-time version of AutoCode would be modified 
to incorporate a common data base to be shared with the quantitative model·and 
pass status information to the knowledge base of the real-time expert system. Qual-
itative models give a predictive element to inference choices which will effect the 
future without interface to a detailed quantitative model. 
3.2 Fault Tolerant Techniques 
The most commonly used fault tolerance technique at a hardware/software level 
include: 
(i) Error-detecting and error-correcting codes which correct transmission of data 
between units of the system. 
(ii) Self-checking logic circuits which provide an indication of faults occurring 
within a unit. 
(iii) Machine status and completion signals, programmed exchange of results, 
checksumming, password, and acknowledgements, which help to achieve fault 
tolerance in software. 
(iv) Duplication and comparison, triple redundancy with majority voting which 
provide additional fault tolerance in hardware. 
The above local sorts of hardware/software based fault checking approaches 
would continue to be implemented with conventional software techniques except 
that we would like to interface them to the real-time expert system so that they can 
be managed in a more comprehensive, but of course, prioritized manner according 
to the time' critical nature of the fault. 
3.2.1 Analytic Redundancy 
The local approaches have gained favor recently because of the lack of c~mfidence 
in global models and the simplicity oflocal FDI. It should be pointed out however, 
7 
that for an actuator displacement which is measured, without global FDI, it is not 
possible to resolve whether 
(i) the sensor failed, 
(ii) the actuator failed, or 
(iii) the surface was partially destroyed and therefore the desired moment effector 
failed. 
Fault detection and isolation, (FDI) or failure detection and identification (FDI) 
involves two stages, filtering and decision making [3], or residual generation and 
decision making [4]. Detection is easier than isolation at least from the prospective 
of implementation, requiring one or several detection filters versus a bank of filters or 
residual generators in th isolation case with at least one residual generator for each 
fault isolation required. Once measurements of the system have been filtered, or 
parameters in a matched filter have been estimated, decisions regarding the nominal 
state could be based on one or more of the following criteria: 
(i) ·Innovations tests (mean, covariance, spectrum), 
(ii) Likelihood-ratios (LR), generalized-likelihood-ratios (GLR), 
(iii) Sequential probability-ratio tests, 
(iv) Parameter values, parameter bounds, and 
(v) Parameter jumps. 
While many different decision making strategies can be made to work, and FDI 
techniques are beginning to be applied, little practical work has been done on the 
"robust" synthesis of the filters. The work by Chow and Willsky [4], and Kosut, 
et al. [5] both give a good theoretical framework for the filter design or residual 
generator design, neither give much detail on the importance of the model struc-
ture used to generate the filter and its relation to the determination of the model 
error necessary for robust design. Gupta and Walker [3] start with a more intu-
itive approach toward the model error and extend frequency shaped LQG synthesis 
concepts to the FDI problem. FDI is part of a larger objective to develop reliable, 
reconfigurable controls, initiated several years ago which has been discussed in the 
literature [6]. 
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Figure 2: Whitening Filter Realization of FDI 
3.3 Analytic Redundancy Approach 
One possible scheme for analytic redundancy is shown in figure 2 where a whitening 
filter is designed to map the plant reference and output signals into the error signal 
e(jw). This signal is then used for FDI. An alternative approach is illustrated in 
figure 3. Here the whitening filter is designed to generate intermediate error e(jw) 
from a model of the nominal plant. This nominal error is then filtered by a state 
space representation of the inverse model error 6.. -1(jW) for the respective detection 
or isolation filter. With any practical implementation of either filter, the error from 
the augmented model must be filtered by a suitable frequency shaping filter 8-1 (8), 
as shown in figure 4, to ensure robust operation where 8-1(8) satisfies the following 
relationship with respect to the true model error 6..0(8), and 6..(8) the assumed 
model error: 
16..(8) - 6..o(s)1 =5 8(s) . 
The shaping function filters low and high frequency uncertainties in the error model 
response, so that the sensitivity of the FDI filter system to uncertainties is greatly 
reduced. Therefore undesirable false alarms, missed alarms, as well as failure iden-
tification are minimized. The design of each filter type must include as much infor-
mation about the particular fault as possible in order to ensure robust performance. 
As described above a bridge between this analytic, detailed quantitative ap-
proach and more abstract models which incorporate broader issues and constraints 
will be a major focus of the research. Work on monitoring flight tests will give a 
practical logical starting point to build up a framework suitable for addressing the 
complexity of fault tolerant flight control overall. 
9 
... r (joJ) 1\ .. Whitening e1 (j{J) e1 (j{J) Fault Metric /:r1 (j{J) .. z(jJJ ) Filter for Computations ~ .. Nominal Plant 
~ 
It Inversion of Model Error 
.. 
............................................................ ... .. 
The above system is equivalent to: 
~ 
(joJ) 
.. Whitening Filter 1\ e1 (j{J) for Nominal 
_ .. Fault Metric .. 
r 
z (jJJ) Plant, Augmented Computation p 
... by Error Model. r 
---- - --- ---- ---------~-
Figure 3: Whitening Filter with Inverse of Model Error 
... 
to. Whitening 1\ 1\ 
.. Filter for eZ (5) 81 (5) e2 Fault Metric Augmented Computations .. 
.. 
.. 
" 
Plant 
" 
... Frequency Shaping Function used in Robust Estimator Design 
Figure 4: FDI System with Frequency Shaping 
10 
,. 
.,. 
,t 
'eo 
Self-repairing control is an entirely analogous area of research. Once the diagno-
sis portion is clearly laid out, this task focuses on incorporating advanced approaches 
such as on-line uncertainty estimation and implementation rules for reduced order 
adaptive control. These algorithms will be controlled by high-level rules and simple 
procedural models by a real-time expert system. The architecture specified will 
take into account the requirements necessary to program such functions. 
11 
4 Real-Time Requirements for Expert System De-
velopment 
The proposed integration of artificial intelligence and trajectory guidance research 
will focus on an advanced generic real-time development environment for self-
repairing flight control system. While the software will be designed to facilitate 
the implementation of advanced analytical feedback control laws, the emphasis in 
this project will be on the development of real-time expert system technology lacking 
in existing expert system shells. The ability to interface analytical databases with 
a logical knowledge base will be a key factor in the development of the embedded 
expert system. 
4.1 Embedded Expert System Development 
While considerable work has been done on expert system technology and develop-
ment shells, little attention has been given to expert systems for real-time on-line 
processes. There are several other packages which have attempted to address this 
significant discipline. These packages have addressed certain issues required for real-
time use, such as shared memory and time tagging of data, but they have neglected 
the issue of scheduling needed for time critical tasks required for on-line monitoring. 
The key features that will be developed for the proposed expert system under 
this program will incorporate the following functions. 
4.1.1 Scheduling 
Real-time expert systems must produce the best conclusion within a fixed amount 
of time. In many cases, the first conclusion will not be the optimal solution due to 
a possible time critical situation. This requires that some sub-optimal solution be 
made quickly and refinement to the solution be done as time goes on. 
Since the expert system may be required to handle many tasks, it should be 
possible to assign priorities to various parts of the heuristic knowledge and have the 
search procedure be interruptible by other tasks which have a higher assigned pri-
ority. The scheduler also needs to have the ability to dynamically reassign priorities 
depending on the incoming data and the stated objectives. 
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4.1.2 Multirate Execution 
Various aspects of the system may require a higher level of evaluation due to the 
dynamics or reliability of the subsystem. It should be possible to specify the fre-
quency with which various conditions are determined or faults are evaluated. This 
evaluation will work in coordination with the scheduler in sorting the priorities of 
the tasks. This will also allow significant savings in computation time where the 
expert system is using precious time wisely where it is most needed. 
4.1.3 Hierarchical Searching 
The user should be allowed to specify a hierarchical priority or any other desirable 
order of search. This makes it possible for the user to assign varying levels of 
importance to different faults or other conditions. For example, in a particular 
operating environment, certain fault characteristics might have a higher level of 
significance in the functioning of the system. This allows the user to cater the 
requirements of the expert system depending on the performance objectives of the 
operation. 
In many cases, the priority of search or detection might change dynamically 
depending on certai~ events that have occurred at an earlier time. This aspect is 
tied closely with the scheduler and the structuring of the knowledge base. This 
function will be considered when determining the overall structure of the system so 
that some form of dynamic reallocation of hierarchical priorities is possible. 
4.1.4 Time-Tagging of Data 
Due to the dynamic nature of the data acquisition being performed, it is necessary 
both to insure that correct data is used for decision making and to have the historical 
data available for referencing and comparison. By time-tagging data, it is possible 
to determine rate of change of states which, in certain conditions, can be analyzed 
with less complex relationships. 
4.1.5 Dynamic Truth Maintenance 
Many short term decisions or sub-optimal decisions are used in long term analysis. 
The short term solutions have been made on the. bases of old data. The validity of 
the short term solution made in the past needs to be checked before being applied 
to current long term solutions. 
13 
4.1.6 On-line Data Interface 
The system must be capable of sampling sensors or inputs at specific intervals and 
storing the data in a database where the expert system will have access to the 
value and the time frame that the data represents. This will constitute the shared 
memory between ,the embedded expert system and the data acquisition system. 
4.1. 7 Interface to Computational Algorithms 
A certain amount of coupled knowledge of the expert system and the computational 
algorithms will be required in the rules developed. This interface makes it possible to 
take extended action (for example, reconfiguring an estimator) based upon certain 
decisions. Without knowledge of the computational algorithms and the effects of 
it on the system, commitment to a decision by the expert system will be near 
impossible. 
4.1.8 Specified Levels of Autonomy 
With a pilot or a remote operator in the loop, the system can be tailorable to the 
level of commitment required. This allows the pilot to have the ultimate control of 
the expert system. Possible levels of autonomy are: 
(i) do it, 
(ii) do it and tell me, 
(iii) tell me and then do it, 
(iv) tell me, but don't do it. 
The operator will specify the level of commitment and decision making automation 
allowed of the expert system. 
4.2 Expert System Software Structure 
The embedded expert system will have the structure shown in figure 5 to satisfy the 
need for real-time execution. Note that the scheduler effects the data acquisition, 
database and the inference engine giving it the level of management required to 
have an interrupt-driven system capable of having multi-rate execution. 
14 
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Figure 5: Structure of Embedded Expert System 
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The characteristics of the key embedded expert system components are described 
in the following subsections. 
4.2.1 Knowledge-Base Development Kit 
This is an off-line module used to create the knowledge base. This would be similar 
to any expert system shell with the exception that it will make it easier to deal with 
numerical data. In particular, the following features will be incorporated. . 
• Initialization and re-initialization 
• General logical expressions on measured data and logical flags (IF-THEN-
ELSE, unconditional, or general logical equations) 
• General arithmetic assignment statement 
• Statistical or other operations on time histories (Le., rules that deal with time 
histories or time history statistical trends rather then individual numbers) 
The other key feature of this off-line system, will be an environment needed 
to create partitioned knowledge and rules bases. This will allow the user to enter 
knowledge relevant to a specific aspect of the system in the portion of the knowledge 
which contains information specific to that sub-area. By partitioning the knowledge 
and rule base, search can be performed more efficently which will be needed in real-
time. This idea of partitioning is presented with a system break down for the 
demonstration of a F-18 aircraft in section 4 of this chapter. 
4.2.2 Scheduler 
The scheduler will be similar to that for any interrupt-driven real-time process. 
This module must allow concurrent operation of database and inference functions . 
. To optimize real-time performance, the scheduler may have to be problem specific. 
Then, it will be necessary to have a code generator for the problem specific scheduler. 
4.2.3 Data Acquisition 
This module should include standard input/output drivers to accept data from any 
of a variety of sources. Multiple sources may be used in parallel. Appropriate 
interfaces to the database must also be provided. 
16 
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4.2.4 Database 
The database should be suitable for storing time histories and time-tagging of all 
data. It should be structured for efficient access both in the storage and the retrieval 
mode. 
4.2.5 Inference En~ine 
The inference engine is the most sophisticated part of the entire software and must 
be small and efficient for real-time use. It must be able to operate with interrupts 
from the scheduler. Other characteristics desirable are: 
(i) Provide the best inference in a fixed computation time, 
(ii) Provide its best inference at any time (e.g. following an interrupt), 
(iii) Provide preliminary inference quickly followed by a more complete evaluation 
of the situation at a later time, and 
(iv) Allow iterative operation such that inferences are refined after each sample 
point. 
The embedded inference engine should in general be able to deal with time 
histories rather than individual value of each variable. Often inferences are based 
on statistical information about time histories and changes in trends in various time 
histories. Many concepts from state transition diagrams (STD) could be useful in 
this development. 
The inference engine will be developed around the C Language Inference Pro-
cessing System (CLIPS) developed by NASA Langley which will be delivered to lSI 
on the start of the Phase II program . 
17 
5 Method of Integration 
In developing an expert system for flight monitoring and self-correcting control, the 
main issue in concern is the dynamic nature of the decision making that must occur. 
The key issues in this project are: 
1. The dynamic nature of the system and information in decision-making or 
operation of expert systems, 
2. Defining the dividing line between the monitoring expert system and the con-
ventional numerical algorithms, and 
3. The expert system used for enhancement of conventional control rather than 
replacement. 
The final objective of the Phase II SBIR will be to develop a prototype expert 
system for self-correcting flight control. A diagram of the structure is shown in 
figure 1. The stages of the development are outlined in the following sections. 
5.1 Step 1: Sensor Failure Recognition 
Shown in figure 8, is the diagram for this step~ This step will require creating rules 
for sensor characteristics to be used. This includes limitations, maximum variations 
and noise characteristics. The basis for this has been developed in the Phase I of 
this program, the results are discussed in the following section. 
5.2 Step 2: Inter-Dependency of State Recognition 
This step requires assuming a simple model for the relation of states. Creating 
simple trend type rules for increasing, decreasing and constant values to draw con-
clusions about expected characteristics of other states. Being able to determine a 
noisy environment and apply filtering (Kalman Filtering) as needed on the output. 
This part of the work is shown in figure 9. 
5.3 Step 3: Dynamic Failure Recognition 
This step requires closing the control loop with the expert system monitoring the 
input and output of the system. Rules and knowledge will be added about the 
18 
• 
.. 
,. 
.. 
effects of control on the state of the system. The expert system is not yet making 
any type of decision, just monitoring the control and trying to determine mishap 
or unexpected behavior of the closed-loop system. The work in this stage is shown 
in figure 10. 
5.4 Step 4: Dynamic Failure Recognition and System Iden-
tification 
The numerical model of the system will be interfaced to the expert system. It will 
be able to simulate the effect of the control on the model to determine the validity 
of the outputs of the system. The system should be able to look at trends of the 
output to determine a state run away or system failure. This step is shown in 
figure 11. 
5.5 Step 5: Failure Recognition and Model Reconfigura-
tion 
Knowledge of system modeling and control will be added to the expert system. 
The expert system will be able to detect some form of failure and determine what 
corrections need to be made and numerically verify its decision. This would be a 
iterative process where the expert system will try to find the most optimal solution 
in the appropriate amount of time. This also means it. must understand the time 
critical nature of certain failures so that some form of decision is made within some 
critical time frame. This is shown in figure 12. 
5.6 Step 6: Failure Recognition and Dynamic Control Recog-
nition 
The reconfiguring scheme is shown in figure 13. The expert system will now be 
able to update the control on the system with the decision making ability of Step 5 . 
The expert system will also need to understand how, for different situations, the 
transition needs to occur. The expert system at that point must realize the failure 
that occurred and contiuously analyze the failure with all its inferences. If the 
system realized that the failure was diagnosed. incorrectly, it must come to a new 
conclusion and reconfigure again. 
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5.7 Step 7: Expert System for Dynamic Environment 
The diagram for this is the final objective of the program, shown in figure 1. The 
decision paths will be put in for updated kalman filtering as needed, the user decision 
flow is added to over ride any decision that the expert system comes too. The 
system will generate replacement code on-line for the controller update. Previously 
the expert system was using existing code in the library of algorithms and inserting 
in the controller. This way, the expert system will replace/modify the control. with 
the most appropriate control parameter and structure. 
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Figure 6: Modular Breakdown of Closed-Loop Aircraft Control System 
6 Demonstration of Self-Repairing Flight Con-
trol System 
Figure 1 shows the final integration objective of the embedded expert system with 
an aircraft flight control system. The emphasis of the overall system is the capability 
of self-repairing control based on a control objective. This section will outline the 
modules of the aircraft and specify the types of faults to be determined. The 
modular breakdown of the system can be seen in figure 6. 
Work on self-correcting control has been done in the past by Alphatech. During 
the Phase II contract effort, this work will be evaluate9, for applicability to this 
demonstration and incorporation of the concepts into the final objectives of Phase II. 
The proposed scheme breaks the components of the aircraft into four main mod-
ules. The diagnosis of the system in the event of a failure is done on the bases of 
these modules. This allows for a efficient search strategy where computation time 
is not wasted trying to isolate particular failures in a region where the failure is 
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known not to occur. The scheme for diagnosis, isolation, and correction is shown 
in figure 7. The fuzzy region represents failures which can not be diagnosed in any 
particular module but instead restricted to a certain region between two consecutive 
modules. 
This task will use a complete 6 degree-of-freedom (6-DOF) nonlinear model of 
an F-18 aircraft. Thrust vectoring and nose strake effects will be included. This 
model will provide a good test for the expert system technology, because multiple 
control needs are available and the flight envelope of the aircraft covers di"verse 
operating regions. 
A nonlinear digital simulation of this aircraft has been developed by NASA. lSI 
will need to obtain this simulation for use in this part of the program effort. 
The following sections summarize each of the aircraft component sub-system 
models. 
6.1 Actuator and Control Surfaces 
In terms of diagnosis, it is near impossible to detect a failure between these two 
modules. Th~ only information available is the input to the actuators. Given a 
control input to the actuators, there is no way of getting data about the output 
of the actuator of the input to the control surfaces. Due to this, in the case of 
the control surface breaking off, that would be covered in the module of dynamics. 
These modules deal strictly with the nature of uncontrollability of the aircraft. The 
diagnosis would lead to a isolation of the failure and if possible a model reconstruc-
tion if the mission objective can be met without the control of the isolated control 
surface. Otherwise this would result in a situation where the operator is informed 
of an abort alert. 
6.2 Aircraft Dynamics 
This module covers all aspects of the F-18 aircraft which are included in the math-
ematical model of the system. When outputs of the model differ from the actual 
outputs of the aircraft in some controlled manner, the diagnosis is the inconsistency 
in the numerical model which means either the controller has to be tuned or the 
system model has to be modified. This module will be the largest part of the em-
bedded expert system self-repairing flight controller. Again, there are fuzzy areas 
on both sides of this modules. These are cases where the control surfaces are not 
functioning correctly or the sensors are giving inconsistent readings. These areas 
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could be diagnosed as an inconsistency with the numerical model. In this case, the 
isolation task will take much longer due to the uncertainty of the diagnosis. 
6.3 Sensors 
Sensor failures will be detected similarly to the method used in the EXSYS demon-
stration. A frame will be created for each sensor with its noise characteristics, 
variation allowance, limitations, etc. Similar rules will be used to determine valid-
ity of the sensor readings. Once a particular sensor is diagnosed as a failure or as a 
malfunction, the isolation will consist of using an observer for the state or an appro-
priate filtering technique. The action for this case will result in the reconfiguration 
of the control depending on the mode of the failure. 
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7 Simplified Example Using Exsys 
A simplified expert system for the purpose of demonstrating fault detection was 
created. This demonstration system incorporated the first three steps outlined in 
the previous section for interfacing of real-time expert system with an aircraft flight 
control system. This example incorporates the basic ideas presented earlier in a 
working demonstration. 
7.1 Sensor Failure Detection 
The rules that where created dealt with sensor failures and simple state interactions. 
Simple characteristics of sensor readings were detected such as, 
1. Sensor reading outside of limit, 
2. Sensor reading in high noise environment, 
3. Sensor varying faster than desired, and 
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4. normal operation. 
For the expert system to come to these conclusions, some characteristic knowledge 
of the sensor and the state, which it represents, was required. The limits allowed on 
the sensor reading corresponded to the physical limitation applied to the sytsem. 
The maximum rate of change was also required along with the sampling time of 
the readings: With this information, conclusions could be made about the noise 
environment and the validity of variations in the sensor readings. 
7.2 Analysis Technique 
Rules were created on the basis of a three point analysis. At time T = t3 , conclusion 
were drawn based on information from tI, t2, and t3 just as at time T = t4, con-
clusions were made based on t2, t3, and t4. By doing this, individual readings are 
not considered due to inherent noise characteristics expected from real-time on-line 
data. Trends of the readings are analyzed and conclusions are drawn on the basis 
of variations of the readings and rate of change of the sensors. 
To test the developed expert system for functionality and to create rules depen-
dent on state interrelationships, the sho~t period longitudinal mode of a C-8 Buffalo 
aircraft was considered. The state variables in the system model are the pitch rate 
q and the angle-of-attack a which obey the differential equations (units deg-sec and 
deg) 
[ 4] = [-1.588 -.562] [ q] [-1.660 ]s a 1.000 -.737 a + -.005 e, 
where Se is the elevator deflection input. The transfer functions from the input to 
each state can be found. For the pitch rate the transfer function is 
Se _ G (8) _ -1.668 - 1.2206 
q - q - 82 + 2.3258 + 1.732 
and the transfer function of the angle-of-attack is 
Se = G
a
(8) = -.0058 - 1.668 
a 82 + 2.3258 + L 732 
As can be seen, both of these transfer functions are second order and it would be 
very difficult to create straight forward rules from them. By combining the two 
transfer functions and eliminating Se the transfer function between pitch rate and 
the angle-of-attack becomes 
~ = G
a 
(8) = .0058 + 1.668 , 
q q 1.668 + 1.2206 
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which is an easier transfer function to approximate. Since the expert system is 
determining rate of change of the sensors, consistency checks can be done with 
.005q + 1.668q - 1.660 
a~ --~~----~------1.2206 . 
This check can be simplified even farther if the expert system determines that one 
of the states is not varying, since at that time the time derivative of that state in 
zero. 
Doing this type of analysis and model reduction, mathematical rules can be 
created based on expected results of the states. This serves as a consistency check 
on the interelationships of the states with each other and with the inputs. 
This expert system is structured similarly to the proposed architecture in the 
previous section. There is a FORTRAN program which performs data acquisition 
and numerical computations. Specific values are passed into the expert sysetm 
which then go through the created rules to find all the possible solutions. The 
results and conclusions that the expert system derives are inserted into a database. 
This database can then be manipulated to act on the conclusions of the expert 
system. The system does not have interrupt or scheduling capabilities which will 
be important elements of the final design. 
The capabilities of this system are limited due to the restricted nature of the 
way knowledge can be represented in the Exsys development environment. Exsys 
only allows the user to represent knowledge in the form of IF-THEN rules which 
is very restrictive when trying to detect a failure in a component of a system. 
Component characteristics can not be structured and represented in an concise rule 
due to the inherant dependancies on other facts. This is why frames and semantic 
nets will be used to structure system knowledge in the proposed expert system. 
Characteristics of a system which are static during a process can be represented 
well using semantic nets. This will include interdependancies of system components 
(i.e., sensors, actuators, etc.). 
7.3 Results of Fault Scenarios 
The expert system was run for the following fo~r scenarios: 
1. Error in pitch rate sensor, 
2. Error in angle-of-attack sensor, 
3. Pitch rate sensor failure, and 
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4. Normal operation. 
The same elevator input was given to all the cases shown in figure 14. 
The rules and the system output from the program are seen in Appendix A. This 
expert system could be considered a sub-module of a larger system where analysis 
can be done on an isolated area to minimize the search through the rule base. The 
output of this system would be sent to a level higher in the expert system so that 
conclusions from the module can be compared with conlusions from other modules. 
This allows for an efficient and organized search and decision making process. 
Case 1: Error in Pitch Rate Sensor 
The expected and actual values of the pitch rate are shown in figure 15. The 
pitch rate data was changed corresponding to a drop in gain at larger magnitudes. 
The expert system was able to detect an inconsistency in the pitch rate and the 
angle-of-attack. Since there was not a rule about the relation of pitch rate and the 
elevator deflection with the given alpha rate, the expert system was not able to 
state an inconsistency between them. 
Case 2: Error in Angle-of-Attack Sensor 
The angle-of-attack sensor failure data is shown in figure 16. The expert system 
was able to detect an inconsistency in the pitch rate and angle-of-attack. Again, 
since this was a, small model, the system does not have a relationship between the 
angle-of-attack and the elevator deflection. 
Case 3: Pitch Rate Sensor Failure 
This scenario of a failure is shown in figure 17. The pitch rate sensor dies at 
a certain point, and remains at the failure value. The expert system is able to 
detect an inconsistency between the pitch rate and angle-of-attack along with an 
inconsistency between the pitch rate and the elevator deflection. With these two 
conclusions, it is possible for the expert system to deduce that the pitch rate sensor 
is most likely the problem since both diagnostic conclusions involve the pitch rate. 
Case 4: Normal Operation 
This case was run and included to show that the expert system is capable of 
realizing w~en the operation is running functionally. 
One of the desired outcomes of the final expert system design, is the capabil-
ity of multi-rate analysis on different parameters. In this demonstration, analysis 
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on the validity of the sensor reading can be done for different sample rates, but 
the interrelationships of the states assumes sampled data value at the same time 
interval. 
7.4 Demonstration Summary 
The demonstration expert system created on Exsys has served as a verifying fea-
sibility example. The basic elements of the proposed interface structure for the 
expert system was incorporated in this demonstration. The issues involved for a 
real-time expert system have not been addressed in the demonstration due to the 
simple nature of the software package used. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the Phase I effort were as follows: 
1. Determination of key features required to address the issues of real-time on-
line monitoring and self-repairing expert systems. 
2. Design 'of architecture of the embedded expert system required to incorp"Orate 
and utilize features for real-time use. 
3. Integration technique required to interface the embedded expert system with 
an aircraft flight control system. 
4. Creation of a simple expert system to demonstrate the techniques and the 
feasibility of the proposed structure to accomplish real-time on-line fault de-
tection, isolation and self-repairing control. 
This research has analyzed the fundamental understanding of the real-time re-
quirements to interface expert system technology with algorithm control computa-
tion. In particular, bringing intelligent fault detection and isolation techniques into 
a high performance aircraft flight control system environment. 
The goal for the end of Phase II is a real-time expert system environment pro-
totype which can be used for developing and integrating fault detection techniques 
with reconfigurable control systems. The Phase I effort has determined the key 
issues that will be addressed and developed in Phase II of this program. 
Although the prototype that will be developed by the end of Phase II will be 
specifically tailored for NASA, the technology developed through the course of the 
research will apply to many different areas requiring real-time expert system tools. 
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Subject: 
Detecting faulty sensor readings in a dynamically changing environment. 
Author: 
Arvind K. Agarwal 
Integrated Systems, Incorporated (C) 
Starting text: 
This expert system will detect the faulty readings in a sensor based on 
the sensor inputs, the maximum and minimum value allowed on the 
sensor, the sampling time used to get the values, and the maximum 
allowed deviation of the sensors between two consecutive readings. 
This expert system will accept three sensor readings. Sensor one will 
be the pitch rate of the aircraft, sensor two is the angle of attack, 
and sensor three is the elevator deflection. 
Ending text: 
The results are as follows: 
Uses all applicable rules in data derivations. 
Calls the external program st 
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RULES: 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
This rule checks the maximum limit on the third reading 
of sensor three. In Exsys a wild card can not be used to 
lock a variable name in a rule, so each reading along with 
a high and low check must be performed. 
RULE NUMBER: 1 
IF: 
[SENSOR33] > [MAXVAL3] 
THEN: 
Sensor three is out of limit - Probability=l 
c 
C This rule checks the third reading of sensor two to 
C check if it is within the lower bounds. If it is, a 
C remark will be made to the output. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 2 . 
IF: 
[SENSOR32]< [MINVAL3] 
THEN: 
Sensor three is out of limit - Probability=l 
C 
C This rule checks to see if the second reading of the 
C of sensor three is within the maximum range. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 3 
IF: 
[SENSOR32] > [MAXVAL3] 
THEN: 
Sensor thre~ is out of limit - Probability=l 
I. 1 
'" 
.. 
e . 
e This. rule checks if the first reading of sensor·three 
e is within the minimum range. 
e 
RULE NU~IBER: 4 
IF: 
[SENSOR3l] < [MINVAL3] 
THEN: 
Sensor three is out of limit - Probability:l 
e 
e This rule checks to see if the iirst reading on sensor three 
e is within the maximum limit. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 5· 
IF: 
[SENSOR3l] > [MAXVAL3] 
THEN: 
Sensor three is out of limit - Probability:l 
e 
e This rule checks if the first reading of sensor one 
e is within the maximum limits. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 6 
IF: 
[SENSORll] > [MAXVALl] 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability:l 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability=l 
e 
e This rule checks if the second reading of sensor one 
e is within the maximum limit. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 8 
IF: 
[SENSOR12] > [MAXVAL1] 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability=l 
e 
e This rule check if the second reading of sensor one . 
e is within the minimum limits. 
e 
RULE NUl-lEER: 9 
IF: 
[SENSOR12] < [MINVAL1] 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability=l 
e 
e This rule checks if the third reading on sensor one 
e is within the maximum limits. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 10 
IF: 
[SENSOR13] > [MAXVAL1] 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability=l 
c 
C This rule checks if the third reading of sensor one 
C is within the minimum range limit. 
e 
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RULE NUMBER: 11 
IF: 
[SENSORr3] < [MINVALl] 
THEN: 
Sensor one out of limit - Probability:l 
c 
C This rule check to see if sensor three has varied 
C in the two stages. If not, then it notifies the system 
C of possibly a bad or stuck sensor. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 12 
IF: 
[SENSOR33] - [SENSOR31] : O. 
and Sensor three in stage one is stuck 
THEN: 
Sensor three is not changing - Probability:l 
ELSE: 
Sensor three in stage two is not stuck 
C 
C This rule checks to see if the combined change in 
C sensor three in the two stages has been larger then 
C allowed. If the change in stage two was satisfactory 
C but not in stage one, then there is possibly high noise 
C in sensor three. . 
RULE NUMBER: 13 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR33] - [SENSOR31])/2*[DELT3]) < [MAXVAR3] 
and Sensor three in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Possible high noise environment in sensor three - Probability:1 
ELSE: 
Sensor three in stage two is not noise 
c 
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C This rule checks the other case of rule 13. If the change 
C in both stages is to high, then possibly the sensor or the 
C state the sensor represents is running away. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 14 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR33] - [SENSOR31])/2*[DELT3]) > [MAXVAR3] 
and Sensor three in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Sensor three changing faster then allowed - Probability:l 
ELSE: 
Sensor three in stage two is not changing 
C 
C This rule checks the variations in sensor two. If no change 
C is seen in both stages, then possibly the sensor is dead. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 15 
IF: 
[SENSOR23] - [SENSOR21] : 0 
and Sensor two in stage one is stuck 
THEN: 
Sensor two is not changing - Probability:l 
ELSE: 
Sensor two in stage two is not stuck 
C 
C This rule checks the rate of change of sensor two. If 
C one of the stages has large variations but the other 
C does not, then there is possibly noise in the sensor. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 16 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR23] - [SENSOR21])/(2*[DELT2]» < [MAXVAR2] 
and Sensor two in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor two. - Probability:l 
4S 
" 
ELSE: 
Sensor two in stage two is not noise 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
This rule is the case of rule 16 where if both stages 
have large variations, then possibly the sensor or the 
state the sensor represents is running away. 
RULE NUMBER: 17 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR23] - [SENSOR21])/(2*(DELT2]» > [MAXVAR2] 
and Sensor two in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Sensor two changing faster then allowed - Probability:1 
ELSE: 
Sensor two in stage two is not changing 
c 
C This rule checks to see if sensor one has changed in 
C the two stages. If it has not, then the sensor could 
C be stuck or dead. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 18 
IF: 
[SENSOR13] 
-
[SENSOR11] : O. 
and Sensor one in stage one is stuck 
THEN: 
Sensor one is not changing - Probability:1 
ELSE: 
sensor one in stage two is not stuck 
C 
C This rule checks the possibility of high noise environment 
C in sensor one. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 19 
IF: 
4E 
ABS(([SENSOR13] - [SENSOR11])/2*[DELT1]) < [MAXVAR1] 
and Sensor one in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor one. - Probability=l 
ELSE: 
sensor one in stage two is not noise 
c 
e This rule checks to see about the possibility of a 
e run away on sensor one. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 20 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR13] - [SENSORl1])/2*[DELT1]) > [M~~VAR1] 
and Sensor one in stage one is changing too quickly 
THEN: 
Sensor one changing faster then allowed. - Probability:! 
ELSE: 
sensor one in stage two is not changing 
e 
C This rule checks to see if all the conditions have 
C been met to say that sensor one is operating 
e functionally. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 21 
IF: 
sensor one in stage two is not stuck 
and sensor one in stage two is not noise 
and sensor one in stage two is not changing 
THEN: 
Sensor one functional ?peration. - Probability:! 
e 
e The rule check to see if the third reading of sensor 
C two is within the minimum value limit. 
e 
47 
.. 
~ 
'. 
RULE NUMBER: 22 
IF: 
[SENSOR23] < [MINVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability:1 
e 
e 
e 
e 
This rule checks to see if the third reading of sensor 
two is within the maximum value limit. 
RULE NUMBER: 23 
IF: 
[SENSOR23] > [MAXVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability:l 
e 
e This rule checks to see if the second reading on sensor 
e two is within the minimum value limit. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 24 
IF: 
[SENSOR22] < [MINVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability:1 
e 
e 
e 
e 
This rule checks to see if the second reading on sensor 
two is within the maximum limit allowed. 
RULE NUMBER: 25 
IF: 
[SENSOR22] > [MAXVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability:1 
48 
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c 
C This rule checks to see if the first reading of sensor 
C two is within the minimum limit range. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 26 
IF: 
[SENSOR21] < [MINVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability=1 
C 
C This rule checks if the first reading on sensor two 
C is within the maximum limit range. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 27 
IF: 
[SENSOR21] > [MAXVAL2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two out of limits. - Probability=l 
C 
C This rule check to see if all the conditions are met 
C to say that sensor two is functionally operational. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 28 
IF: 
Sensor two in stage two is not stuck 
and Sensor two in stage two is not noise 
and Sensor two in stage two is not changing 
THEN: 
Sensor two functional" operation. - Probability=l 
C 
C This rule checks to see if all the conditions are met 
C to say that sensor three is functionally operational. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 29 
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IF: 
Sensor three in stage two is not changing 
and Sensor three in stage two is not noise 
and Sensor three in stage two is not stuck 
THEN: 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Sensor three functional operation. - Probability=l 
This rule check the consistence between the dynamical 
relationship between the angle-of-attack and the elevator 
deflection when the rate of change of the pitch rate is zero. 
RULE NUMBER: 30 
IF: 
Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and ABS([SENSOR22] - .0029*[VAR3] + .963*[SENSOR32]) > .03 
THEN: 
c 
Inconsistency in angle of attack and elevat9r deflection. -
Probability=l 
C This rule checks the dynamical relationship between the 
C angle-bf-attack and elevator deflection when the rate of 
C change of the pitch rate and the angle-of-attack is zero. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 31 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and ABS([SENSOR22] - [SENSOR32]) > .03 
THEN: 
C 
Inconsistency in angl.e of attack and elevator deflection. 
Probability=l 
C This rule check the dynamical relationship between the 
C pitch rate and the angle-of-attack when the rate of 
C change of the pitch rate and the angle-of-attack is zero 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 32 
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IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and ABS([SENSOR12] - .75*[SENSOR22]) > .03 
THEN: 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and angle of attack. - Probability=1 
c 
C This rule checks the dynamical relation between the p~t6h 
C rate and the elevator deflection when the rate of change 
C of the pitch rate is zero. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 33 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and ABS([SENSOR12] + .958*[VAR3] + .7046*[SENSOR32]) > .03 
THEN: 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and elevator deflection. - Probabilit-
C 
C This rule checks the rate of variation in sensor one in 
C stage one. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 34 
IF: 
ABS«[SENSOR12] - [SENSOR11])/[DELTl]) > [MAXVAR1] 
THEN: 
Sensor one in stage one is changing too quickly 
ELSE: . 
Sensor one in stage one is varying 
e 
C This rule checks to see if sensor one in stage one 
C could possibly be stuck. 
e 
RULE NUMBER: 35 
IF: 
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ABS(([SENSOR12] - [SENSORll]» = O. 
THEN: 
Sensor one in stage one· is stuck 
c 
c 
c 
c 
This rule checks the variation of sensor two in stage one 
to ensure that it has changed less then allowed. 
RULE NUMBER: 36 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR22] - [SENSOR21])/[DELT2]) > [MAXVAR2] 
THEN: 
Sensor two in stage one is changing too quickly 
ELSE: 
Sensor two in stage one is varying 
c 
C Thir rule checks to see if possibly sensor two could 
C be stuck in stage one. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 37 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR22] - [SENSOR21]» = 0 
THEN: 
Sensor two in stage one is stuck 
C 
C This rule checks the variation on sensor three in 
C stage one to see if it is within the allowed range. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 38 
IF: 
THEN: 
ABS(([SENSOR32] - [SENSOR31])/[DELT3]} > [MAXVAR3] 
Sensor three in stage one is changing too quickly 
r:'" JL. 
ELSE: 
Sensor three in stage one is varying 
C 
C This rule checks to see if sensor three. has changed 
C in ~tage one. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 39 
IF: 
ABS(([SENSOR32] - [SENSOR31]» = o. 
THEN: 
Sensor three in stage one is stuck 
C 
C This rule checks the number of iterations to see 
C when to stop. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 40 
IF: 
[POSITION] = [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
and stop 
C 
C 16·rules follow allowing the system to report to a 
C different system or different part of the same system 
C about the condition of the operation. Error handling 
C programs can be installed in this program to handle the 
C errors in different. manners. 
C This rule reports that t~e pitch rate sensor and the 
C angle-of-attack sensor are changing faster then allowed. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 41 
IF: 
Sensor one changing faster then allowed. = 1 
and Sensor two changing faster then allowed = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
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report (specify) , 
C 
C This rule reports that both the pitch rate and the 
C angl'e-of-attack sensor might have high noise present. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 42 
IF: 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor one. = 1 
and Possibly high noise environment in sensor two. = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor and the 
C angle-of-attack sensor are not changing, meaning they 
Cmight be dead of stuck. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 43 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and [POSITION] < (CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
This rule reports that both the pitch rate and the 
angle-of-attacksensor are operating functionally. 
RULE NUMBER: 44 
IF: 
Sensor one functional operation. = 1 
and Sensor two functional operation. = 1 
and (POSITION] < (CHECK] 
THEN': 
report(specify) 
54 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is changing 
C faster then allowed and the angle-of-attack sensor could 
C be in a high noise environment. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 45 
IF: 
Sensor one changing faster then allowed. : 1 
and Possibly high noise environment in sensor two. : 1 
and [POSITION]· < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is changing 
C faster then allowed and the angle-of-attack sensor could 
C be stuck or dead. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 46 
IF: 
Sensor one changing faster then allowed.: 1 
and Sensor two is not changing : 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK) 
THEN: 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
report(specify) 
This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is changing 
faster then allowed and the angle-of-attack sensor is operating 
functionally. 
RULE NUMBER: 47 
IF: 
Sensor one changing faster then allowed. : 1 
and Sensor two functional operation. : 1 
and [POSITION) < [CHECK) 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
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C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor has high noise 
C and that the angle-of-attack sensor is changing faster then 
C allowed. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 48 
IF: 
and 
and 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor one. = 1 
Sensor two changing faster then allowed = 1 
[POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor has high 
C noise and that the angle-of-attack sensor is not changing 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 49 
IF: 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor one. = 1 
and Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
C 
C 
C 
C 
report(specify) 
This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor has high noise 
and that the angle-of-attack sensor is o~erating functionally. 
RULE NUMBER: 50 
IF: 
Possibly high noise environment in sensor one. = 1 
and Sensor two functional operation. = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
56 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is not changing 
C and that the variation on the ang~e-of-attack sensor is larger 
C then allowed. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 51 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Sensor two changing faster then allowed = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is not changing 
C and that the angle-of-attack sensor has high noise. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 52 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Possibly high noise environm~nt in sensor two. = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify} 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is not changing 
C and that the angle-of-attack sensor is operating functionally. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 53 
IF: 
Sensor one is not changing = 1 
and Sensor two functional operation. = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is operating 
C functionally and the angle-of-attack sensor is changing 
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C faster then allowed. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 54 
IF: 
Sensor one functional operation. = 1 
and Sensor two changing faster then allowed = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is operating 
C functionally and the angle-of-attack sensor is in a high 
C noise environment. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 55 
IF: 
Sensor one functional operation. = 1 
and Possibly high noise environment in sensor two. = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
C 
C This rule reports that the pitch rate sensor is operating 
C functionally and that the angle-of-attack sensor is not 
C changing and could possibly be dead. 
C 
RULE NUMBER: 56 
'''IF: 
Sensor one functional operation. = 1 
and Sensor two is not changing = 1 
and [POSITION] < [CHECK] 
THEN: 
report(specify) 
58 
In 
.. 0 
" 
Time Tick 
3 
4 
.. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
.. 
'. 12 
13 
14 
15 
OUTPUT FOR CORRECT SENSOR VALUES 
Diagnosis 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l· 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:! 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:! 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation~: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: ProbabilitY:1 
Sensor three functional operation.:Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
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Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: ProbabilitY=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probabil~ty=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
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ERROR IN PITCH RATE SENSOR 
Diagnosis 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=! 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=!' 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=! 
Sensor two is.not changing: Probability=! 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functiona~ operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
. Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of ~ttack.: Probability=! 
Sensor one' functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of·attack.: Probability=! 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=! 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=! 
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Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=! 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functiona~ operation.: Probab~lity=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three· is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional. operation .. : Probability=1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=1 
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ERROR IN ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SENSOR 
Diagnosis· 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: ProbabilitY:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
. angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability:l 
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Sensor two functional operation.: ProbabilitY=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l 
65 
lo 
Time Tick 
3 
.. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
.. 11 
'", 
12 
13 
14 
PITCH RATE SENSOR DIES 
Diagnosis 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probabil~ty=l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l· 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability=l 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=1 
Senso~ two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability=1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Probability=1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability=1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability=1 
Sensor three fu~ctional operation.: Probability=1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
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angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Probability:1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:l 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three functional operation.: Probability:1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Pro~ability:1 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.: Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:1 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
\' 
angle of attack.: Probability:l r 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.:.Probability:l 
Sensor one is not changing: Probability:1 
Sensor two functional operation.: Probability:l 
Sensor three is not changing: Probability:l 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
angle of attack.: Probability:1 
Inconsistency in pitch rate and 
elevator deflection.~ Probability:l 
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